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function of annexation; and (3) whether the 1998 Order properly
interpreted the 1995 Order to grant all the area outside the exclusive
service of Centerville to Warner Robins.
The Supreme Court of Georgia held: (1) the 1995 Order was
properly treated as a consent judgment; (2) the superior court did not
usurp control over a legislative function; and (3) the superior court
properly interpreted the 1995 Order to designate to Warner Robins all
the area outside the exclusive service area of Centerville.
First, the court recognized that the original 1995 consent order
resulted from an affirmative act of the parties, rather than the
judgment of the court following litigation of the issues. The court
noted that a consent judgment is a voluntary stipulation by the parties
entered into in order to resolve a dispute. The 1995 Order was the
culmination of settlement efforts of Centerville and Warner Robins in
determining service areas.
Thus, the superior court properly
characterized the 1995 Order as a consentjudgment.
In deciding the second issue, the court recognized that the power
of annexation is a legislative function, not subject to control by the
judiciary. However, the superior court did not attempt to usurp
control over this function, it merely enforced the 1995 Order. In the
1995 Order, Centerville agreed not to seek annexation of property
within the Warner Robins service area. Thus, the superior court
merely sought to enforce that agreement.
Finally, the court noted that the 1995 Order failed to clearly
describe the Warner Robins service area in the same detail as it
described the Centerville service area. However, the superior court
properly used the general rules of contract construction in referring to
the record in order to construe the ambiguity. The record clearly
indicated the intent of the parties to designate to Warner Robins all
the area outside of Centerville's exclusive service area. Thus, the
superior court properly interpreted the 1995 Order.
CandaceDeen

KANSAS
Water District No. 1 v. Mission Hills Country Club, 960 P.2d 239 (Kan.
1998) (holding water district had an exclusive right under the Water
District Act to provide pressurized treated water by pipeline within the
district's boundaries and that this exclusive right did not violate the
Commerce Clause).
A privately owned Kansas Water Company ("KWC") obtained its
water supply from Kansas City, Missouri. In 1990, Water District No. 1
("District"), pursuant to the Kansas Water District Act ("Act"),
voluntarily annexed the area served by KWC. Therefore, Mission Hills
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Country Club ("Club") became subject to the District's service area.
In 1994, the District developed a new rate structure to enhance its
water supply facilities and distributions, due to the large requirements
of the Club. As a result, the Club's water bill increased dramatically.
To combat the increased rate, the Club sought alternative means of
water distribution and entered into a lower priced purchase
agreement with the water department of Kansas City, Missouri. The
Club intended to construct a private pipeline to transport the water for
its greens and fairways.
The Club notified the District of the agreement and the District
objected on the grounds that it had an exclusive right to supply treated
water to citizens within its boundaries. The Club informed the District
of its intent to disregard the rule and the District brought suit to
enjoin the Club from obtaining an alternative water source.
The issues before the Supreme Court of Kansas were: (1) whether
the District had an exclusive right under the Water District Act to
provide treated water by pipeline within the District's boundaries; and
(2) whether this exclusive right violated the Commerce Clause. The
supreme court answered the former in the affirmative and the latter in
the negative.
The supreme court recognized that exclusivity in municipal
services has received judicial endorsement in Kansas. The legislature
reasoned that two water districts could not serve a territory at the same
time by adopting McQuillin Municipal Corporations §7.08:
"[I] ntolerable confusion instead of good government would obtain in
a territory in which two municipal corporations of like kind and
powers attempted to function coincidentally."
The court also focused on the phrase "supply and distribution
system" used throughout the Act in rendering its decision. A Kansas
statute, § 19-3509, provides that "the water district board shall ... have
the exclusive control of the water supply and distribution
facilities.... ." The control of water supply and distribution prohibited
any other person or entity from controlling the supply and distribution
of water. Thus, the court concluded, the Club could not use a pipeline
to bring treated water into the District's boundaries.
The Club argued that, in Kansas, utility customers are not normally
precluded from obtaining their own supply of heat, light or water for
private use. The court stated that the Club misconstrued the statute it
was asserting and that it only applied to the first part of the statute
concerning telephones, telegraphs or conveyance of oil and gas.
The Club also argued, pursuant to statute, that if a city grants a
franchise to furnish water services that the franchise cannot be
exclusive. However, the court stated that the legislature granted the
District exclusive power. As the municipality involved, the District was
a "quasi-municipal body corporate with the power of eminent
domain."
Furthermore, the court reasoned that the Kansas
Constitution does not prohibit municipalities from granting exclusive
franchises.
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In supporting its claim that the District's exclusive right violated
the Commerce Clause, the Club relied on C & A Carbone, Inc. v.
Clarkstown. In Carbone,the United States Supreme Court held that an
ordinance violated the Commerce Clause because it required all incounty possessors of trash to use a specific transfer station, thus
depriving in-state and/or out-of-state processors of waste processing
and disposal business. The Kansas Supreme Court distinguished this
case from Carbone in that the District, itself, performs the entire piped
pressurized water production and delivery operation within its
boundaries; thus, it provided a municipal service.
The supreme court also relied on U.S.A. Recycling, Inc. v. Town of
Babylon. The court applied the reasoning in U.S.A. and held that in
creating the District, Kansas had not favored in-state water producers
over out-of-state competitors nor had it hindered business from
competing against a group of local proprietors. Based on this
reasoning, the supreme court found the market participant exception
inapplicable. The State of Kansas eliminated the market for piped
water when it created the District, which, in turn, fulfilled a
governmental duty. Therefore, no market existed due to the exclusive
nature of the municipal services. Furthermore, the District did not
impose any burdens on interstate commerce and arguably, the benefits
of the municipal services would outweigh any burdens that may have
been placed on interstate commerce.
Anna Litaker

MAINE
Dorey v. Spicer, 715 A.2d 182 (Me. 1998) (holding that the owner of
downstream property had no flowage rights relative to upstream dam
when: (1) he did not own lot on which dam was located; (2) the
easement he relied upon, created by conveyance of half-interest in the
sawmill, was extinguished when gristmill owner gave back that interest
to sawmill owner; (3) any appurtenant easement, created by the Mills
Act, was incapable of existence separate from the land containing the
dam).
Peter M. Dorey ("Dorey") the downstream owner of property along
Gristmill Brook ("Brook"), which originated from Foster Pond
("Pond"), filed an action naming as defendants forty-four owners of
waterfront property on the Pond. Dorey sought a declaration of his
rights to operate the Pond dam, inclusive of a right to flood the
waterfront land of the Pond. Dorey also sought an injunction stopping
any defendants from interfering with those rights. Dorey used the
connection between the original dam and the current surrounding
land rights as a basis for his claim.

